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1. CROSS-BORDER SPILLOVERS AND COMPLEMENTARITIES BETWEEN REFORMS 
A key part of the Lisbon strategy 
Cross-border spillovers and complementarities between reforms are at the heart of the Lisbon 
strategy for Growth and Jobs. These interlinkages make a strong case for a comprehensive 
and coordinated approach to the structural reform agenda. The need to better exploit such 
effects was a driving force behind the adjustments to the governance arrangements, 
introduced in the course of the mid-term review of the Strategy in 2005. In this effort, the re-
launched Strategy relies inter alia on the partnership to secure national ownership of the 
Lisbon strategy while facilitating a coordinated approach to reforms, the integration of reform 
efforts across policy areas and the better alignment of reforms at EU and national level (in 
part via a Community Lisbon Programme). As a result, the effectiveness of the reform 
processes at both national and EU levels in terms of their potential to generate robust growth 
and new and better jobs has increased. Moreover, the partnership approach is designed to 
foster demonstration effects and institutional learning from the example of reformers and to 
spread good practices. These political spillover effects add to the overall reform momentum 
through reducing uncertainty associated with structural reforms and facilitating their 
implementation. 
Cross-border spillovers 
Actions taken by one national government have an impact on the performance of other 
countries as well and thus also implications for the formulation of their economic policies. 
These cross-border spillovers materialise through intensive flows of goods and investment but 
also flows of knowledge and innovations. In such cases, purely national, uncoordinated, 
action would be suboptimal because the important cross-border externalities or economies of 
scale would be left unexploited. For example, policies to boost R&D and innovation benefit 
not only domestic companies and industries but also other countries through the transfer and 
utilisation of the generated knowledge. Similarly, the gains from competition enhancing 
reforms that boost growth and productivity spill over abroad through greater demand for 
imports, supply of cheaper exports and more investment opportunities.  
The size of spillovers depends on the relative strength of several effects some of which work 
against each other. This underlines the importance of empirical investigation of these 
transmission channels of spillovers. The benefits of structural reforms usually spill over to 
other countries through greater trade exchange. The increased demand in the reforming 
country due to increases in income is partially covered through the increase in imports from 
abroad. In this way, the trading partners gain as the demand for their exports rises. The high 
degree of economic integration achieved in the EU strengthens this effect. While, for 
example, external openness to trade in goods in the EU is relatively low and comparable to 
that in the US (average exports and imports as a share of GDP in the EU and the US stood at 
10.8% and 11.3% respectively in 2006) intensity of intra-EU trade is much higher for most of 
the Member States. Overall, average intra-EU exports and imports of goods accounted for 
21.1% of GDP in 2006. For all Member States, the markets in other EU countries are the most 
important destination for their exports. For virtually all of them, intra-EU trade accounts for 
more than 60% of their overall trade exchange and for some of them this share reaches more 
than 80% (CZ and SK). Nonetheless, this positive short-run spillover effect can be partially or 
entirely eliminated through the long-run improvements in competitiveness of the reforming 
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country (i.e. prices and wages decline and real depreciation occurs) which may reverse the 
trade balance with the non-reformers. Moreover, investment flows into the reforming 
countries which are attracted by higher returns on capital further work against the trade 
channel. 
In addition to the flows of goods, services, capital and to some extent labour, an important 
source of interactions between EU countries stems from the intangible flow of knowledge 
which gives rise to the so-called knowledge or technological spillovers. In fact, some of the 
knowledge spillovers are associated with the flows of goods or capital as new ideas and 
technologies can be imbedded in products or physical capital that cross borders. Similarly, the 
circulation of skilled labour helps disseminate knowledge and contributes to boosting 
innovation. Empirically, the knowledge spillovers prove to be a very strong positive 
transmission channel and drive the overall results in investigations of the size of cross-border 
spillovers of policies in many areas. 
If empirically relevant, the existence of cross-border spillovers of national structural reforms 
gives a rationale for acting together. The maximisation of welfare for the Union as a whole 
would, in the presence of strong spillover effects, generally require coordination of economic 
policies so as to make sure that these externalities are fully internalised. For example, if a part 
of the benefits from structural reform spills over to other countries due to the decline in terms 
of trade, the countries may have lower incentives to get engaged in reforming activities. As 
another example of such a case, it is possible to mention the negative spillover on a reforming 
country from its unreformed neighbours in a monetary union. If one country reforms, higher 
productivity and lower structural unemployment in that country translate into lower inflation. 
However, single country reforms will not influence the euro area aggregate figures 
significantly and are unlikely to trigger an accompanying response by the ECB in the form of 
cutting the interest rate. To the extent that reforms have short-term costs, the incentives for 
reforms are reduced in the absence of supportive monetary stance, leading to sub-optimal 
level of reforms in the euro area as a whole.
1
 The existence of this negative spillover, coupled 
with the high intensity of economic interlinkages, underlines the importance for enhanced 
policy coordination in the euro area, particularly in view of the need for greater adjustment 
capacity to deal with adverse economic shocks with asymmetric impacts on the individual 
euro area countries. 
Complementarities in the Lisbon strategy 
There are also important complementarities between reform measures within or across policy 
domains which give rise to potentially strong synergies from their coordinated 
implementation. Comprehensive and internally coherent national reform strategies thus bear 
promise of enhancing the pay off from their implementation. On the contrary, isolated reforms 
may fail to deliver the expected benefits unless accompanied by appropriate complementary 
measures. For instance, efforts to boost R&D and innovation are strongly complementary 
with policies to enhance skills of workers. In the absence of sufficient supply of highly trained 
researchers, additional spending on R&D activities will only lead to increases in wages of the 
currently employed researchers without a significant impact on the output in terms of new 
ideas, technologies or innovations. Another example of exploitation of synergies are the 
"flexicurity" approaches to labour market reform which combine a number of measures that 
                                                 
1
 Pisani-Ferry, 2005. 
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encompass the set-up of flexible contractual arrangements, comprehensive life-long learning 
policies, effective ALMPs and modern social security systems. The emphasis is on the 
interplay and coherence of policies rather than on single policy measures which allows to 
widen the focus from "security on-the-job" to the broader notion of "security to remain in the 
employment". Also, the reduction of administrative burdens, through greater efficiency, 
higher competition and lower mark-ups, has synergies with measures aimed at increasing 
employment due to a reduction in equilibrium unemployment. Furthermore, efforts to put 
public finances on a sound and sustainable basis are a pre-condition for growth and viable 
social protection systems in the face of population ageing. Such efforts release public 
resources which can be used for promoting physical and human capital formation, and thus 
growth potential over the long-run.  
In addition, carefully designed comprehensive reform strategies can take advantage of 
political economy complementarities to help overcome resistance against their 
implementation. For instance, product market reforms generally pave way to reforms in 
labour markets as greater competition and higher risk of bankruptcy of uncompetitive firms 
make the need for labour market reforms more obvious for employers as well as employees 
and trade unions. Furthermore, by pursuing an integrated set of reforms, policy debates take 
place amongst a wider group of stakeholders with heterogeneous interests, thus helping to 
generate constituencies which provide a counter-weight to vested interest groups who benefit 
disproportionately from the status quo. In this respect, the existence of the appropriate 
institutional framework at national level where the different stakeholders can systematically 
discuss broad reform agendas may be a pre-condition for consensus-building. Finally, 
integrated reform strategies can encompass compensatory measures so that the stakeholders 
are supported through what can be a painful adjustment processes. In this respect, reform 
packages can also take into account the overall time profile of the benefits of reforms and 
associated costs and thereby cater for the fact that some reforms have an immediate impact, 
whereas in other cases the benefits only materialise after a significant time lag. 
Model simulations to quantify the size of spillovers and complementarities 
An assessment of the nature and size of the cross-border spillover effects and 
complementarities between reform measures thus contributes to the full understanding of the 
gains to be reaped from the coordination in the area of structural policies and full 
implementation of the reforms envisaged under the Growth and Jobs Strategy. 
Model simulations underline the importance of cross-border spillovers in many policy areas, 
though their importance varies (see Table 1 for a summary of the results
2
): 
• Policies aimed at boosting R&D and innovation have the largest positive effect on other 
EU countries. This is not surprising as the flows of knowledge feature are the most 
significant transmission channel for spillovers in the EU. If Member States achieve the 
                                                 
2
 A model, being a stylized description of the economy, cannot always translate directly a given policy 
initiative. In such cases a change in a variable or parameter linked to the policy measure is changed in 
the model to capture the reform being simulated. The size of the shock, the choice of the 
variable/parameter to be changed as well as the specific characteristics of the model used determine the 
final outcome. For these reasons the usual caveats in interpreting results have to be borne in mind. The 
simulations presented in table 1 and in table 2 arise from different General Equilibrium Models (mainly 
WorldScan and QUEST) and the fact that results are typically of the same order of magnitude can be 
seen as a sign of robustness of the result. 
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R&D intensity targets announced in their National Reform Programmes, R&D 
expenditures in the EU will increase from 1.9% of GDP in 2004 to 2.7% in 2010.
3
 
Simulations with the WorldScan model show that this could lead to an increase in output 
of 3.3% for the European Union as whole. Cross-border knowledge spillovers would 
account for roughly half of these gains.  
• Simultaneous implementation of other types of reforms would also give rise to extra 
benefits albeit significantly smaller. If implemented across the whole EU, measures aimed 
at upgrading skills of workers would lead to a long-run increase in GDP of 2.1%. Cross-
country spillovers would account for 0.1 percentage point which is approximately 5% of 
the total impact.  
• Reforms aimed at cutting the overall administrative burden by 25% as specified by the 
European Council raise the level of output by 1.1-1.9% with spillover effects reaching 0.1 
percentage point of GDP on average which accounts for 5 to 10%.  
• Similar simulations with the QUEST model confirm the importance of knowledge 
spillovers: long-run GDP gains (after 50 years) from increasing the R&D intensity to the 
EU-wide target (currently 2.54% of GDP) for a small open EU economy would be higher 
by around 1 percentage point if R&D spending is promoted in the whole EU compared to 
an isolated action in this country (isolated action would increase GDP by 3.8% while a 
coordinated one by 4.8%). The spillover thus accounts for around 20% of the overall 
effect.
4
  
Table 1: Spillover effects of reforms
5
 
Policy area Model Simulation assumptions 
Overall long-
run effect on 
GDP in EU 
Average 
spillovers (as 
share of overall 
effect) 
WorldScan 
Increasing R&D intensity from 
1.86% to 2.7% in 2010 (partially 
paid through a R&D subsidy 
financed by lump-sum transfers 
from households). 
3.3% 50% 
R&D 
QUEST III 
Increasing R&D intensity from 
1.86% to 2.54% in 10 years 
through a R&D subsidy 
(financed from consumption 
tax).  
4.8%* 20% 
                                                 
3
 It should be noticed that some Member States have revised their R&D targets, and the most recent R&D 
targets imply that the EU would spend 2.54% of GDP on R&D in 2010. 
4
 By long run it is meant the time horizon needed for the full impact of the measure to materialise, taken 
into account the dynamics in the economy. 
5
 The figures reported in the table should be interpreted as annual GDP effects. These effects need time to 
fully materialise, and smaller impacts will already be visible before reaching the full effect. For 
example, the implementation of the R&D targets will ultimately yield an annual effect of 3.3% (relative 
to baseline) according to the WorldScan simulations, but smaller impacts will already develop in earlier 
years. 
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Skills WorldScan 
Achieving skill targets set by 
2003 European Council. Input 
into simulation (effects on labour 
efficiency from these policies 
and demographic developments) 
were modelled in a special 
model.  
2.1%* 5% 
WorldScan 
Reduction in administrative 
burden by 25% modelled as a 
labour efficiency shock. 
1.9% 5% 
Administrative 
burden 
NiGEM 
Reduction in administrative 
burden by 25% modelled as a 
shock to mark-up of prices over 
unit costs. 
1.1% 10% 
Source: European Competitiveness Report 2007 (European Commission 2007) for the simulation results with 
WorldScan and NiGEM. For further details see Lejour and Rojas-Romagosa (forthcoming) on WorldScan, and 
Barrel and Kirby (forthcoming) on NiGEM. For the QUEST simulations, see Roeger, Varga and in'tVeld 
(forthcoming). 
Notes: * these figures refer to long-run effects while the others to year 2025. 
 
Regarding complementarities, coordinated implementation of packages of reforms may 
indeed magnify the economic benefits as the underlying complementarities are exploited. 
Model simulations with the WorldScan model explored the effects of jointly implementing 
the reforms to enhance skills, reaching the employment targets, boosting R&D spending and 
cutting red tape. Overall, combined implementation of measures in these four policy areas 
brings an extra 0.4 percentage point increase in output and 0.3 percentage point of 
consumption in the EU-27 relative to the sum of effects of the separate policies. 
2. COMPLEMENTARITIES BETWEEN NATIONAL REFORM POLICIES AND POLICIES AT 
THE EU LEVEL  
A revised Community Lisbon Programme 
The revised Lisbon strategy recognises the important complementarities between national 
reform policies and policies at the EU level. The Commission has put forward a proposal for a 
revised Community Lisbon Programme which identifies a streamlined number of reform 
actions that can be taken at EU level, and which moreover are focussed on the same key four 
priority actions (knowledge and innovation, business potential, adaptability of labour markets 
and energy and climate) which Member States are invited to consider when they draft their 
National Reform Programmes for the 2008-11 Lisbon cycle.  
Actions planned at the Community level can complement, facilitate or strengthen policy 
actions envisaged at the national level. For example, the efforts to complete the Internal 
Market and create thus the level playing field for all the companies can generate momentum 
for other reforms at the national level. Similarly, Community-driven efforts to achieve a 
greater degree of financial market integration and better availability of venture capital are 
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complementary to the plans of many Member States to reduce high administrative entry 
barriers for start ups and regulatory burdens on firms in general.  
Model simulations to quantify the impact of the main measures in the revised Community 
Lisbon Programme  
The priority actions at the EU level, featuring in the new streamlined Community Lisbon 
Programme, also have a potential to deliver substantial economic benefits. Several 
simulations to quantify the impact of a number of important measures in the revised 
Community Lisbon Programme have been carried out using the WorldScan and QUEST 
models of the Commission. Table 2 summarises the main results of these simulations, which 
are described in more detail below. 
Table 2. Estimated Economic Impacts of Individual Measures contained in the CLP 
Specific measure Model 
Assumptions of 
the simulations 
Shocks 
implemented in the 
model 
Medium-term 
Impact on EU
a
 
GDP
b
 
QUEST III 
(endogenous growth 
version) 
50 basis point 
reduction in the EU 
equity risk premia 
0.75% in 2020 
and 1% after 20 
years 
Financial market 
integration 
WorldScan 
Reduction of 
costs of lending 
by 50 basis 
points 
Reduction in cost of 
capital implemented 
through a reduction 
in the tax on 
investment 
0.5% 
QUEST III 
(endogenous growth 
version) 
10 basis point 
reduction in equity 
premium and 
reduction in entry 
barriers (fixed costs) 
for innovating firms
c
 
by 10% 
0.75% in 2020 
and 1% after 20 
years 
 
Mutual recognition of 
venture capital  
WorldScan 
Removal of 
existing 
regulatory and 
tax obstacles to 
cross-border VC 
funds leading to 
current best 
performers’ 
average use of 
VC capital for 
all MS, 
effectively 
leading to 
additional 20 
billion euros a 
year for venture 
capital 
Increase in total 
factor productivity 
(TFP) for high-tech 
manufacturing and 
(business) services 
0.6% 
QUEST III 
25% reduction in 
administrative 
burden from EU 
legislation (35% 
of the overall 
burden) 
1) reduction in fixed 
costs 
2) reduction in fixed 
costs and a drop in 
mark-ups due to 
higher competition 
0.3% (1) - 0.6%  
Community 
contribution to 
reduction of 
administrative 
burdens 
WorldScan  Increase in labour 0.6% 
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efficiency 
Electronic 
communications 
WorldScan 
Increased 
productivity 
through higher 
degree of market 
integration 
Increase in capital 
efficiency for 
telecommunication 
services to EU 
average 
0.2% 
QUEST III 
(tradable/non-tradable 
version) 
1) increase in labour 
augmenting progress 
by 22% or 2) mark-
up reduction by 11 
percentage points 
0.2% (1) - 0.4% 
(2) 
Unbundling 
electricity markets 
WorldScan 
10% decline in 
energy prices 
Productivity increase 
by 22% 
0.3% 
QUEST III (version 
with labour force 
decomposed 
according to the level 
of skills) 
0.03 percentage point 
increase in share of 
high-skilled labour 
each year 
0.2% in 2020 and 
0.25% after 20 
years 
 
“Blue card” for entry 
of highly skilled 
workers 
WorldScan 
Inflow of highly-
skilled workers 
from outside of 
EU by 74300 
between 2012-
2020 
Increase in supply of 
high-skilled workers 
equivalent to the 
target 
0.2% in EU25 
Achieving the 20% 
independent 
greenhouse gas goal 
for 2020 
GEM E3
d
 
Cost efficient 
EU 27-wide CO2 
reduction with 
no access to 
CDM and no 
assessment of 
positive impacts 
of co-benefits. 
Introduction of a 
carbon value in all 
sectors. But without 
revenue recycling 
through e.g. 
auctioning. 
-0.5% 
Environmental 
technologies 
WorldScan 
Increased energy 
efficiency of 
electrical motors 
through 
technical 
innovation 
TFP increase 
corresponding to 
41% energy 
efficiency increase 
for 30% of electrical 
motors by 2020 
0.4% 
Free trade agreements 
with Korea, India 
and ASEAN 
Computable general 
equilibrium models 
(footnote d) 
Maximal Free-
Trade 
Agreements 
Reductions in 
bilateral tariff and 
non-tariff barriers 
0.1% 
Source: Commission services using WorldScan, QUEST and GEM E3 models 
Notes:  
a) Results for the QUEST model refer to EU-27 while results for the WorldScan model refer to EU-25. 
b) The effects are reported as annual GDP impact in 2020. When the full impact of the reform materialises after 
2020the effect 20 years after implementation is also reported. 
c) In the model a distinction is made between innovating firms, producing intermediates which have to invest in 
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knowledge (patents) in order to start production and final goods producers which do not require particular 
knowledge investments. 
d) European Commission (2007). 
 
It should be noted that these model estimates only cover the economic effects of the foreseen 
measures. It is reasonable to assume that the reform drive at the Community level will add to 
the national reform momentum through political economy effects, e.g. these reforms may 
facilitate accompanying measures in the respective policy domains or facilitate other 
complementary reforms. The effects stemming from such political economy 
complementarities can be potentially powerful. For instance, the Community action directed 
at completing the Internal Market (e.g. the below analysed initiatives to proceed with 
liberalisation of network industries, complete the integration of financial markets or create 
truly internal market for environmental technologies) can generate political momentum for 
nationally-driven labour market reforms. 
Moreover, these simulations generally present only direct economic effects of these actions 
and do not explore interactions with the reforms at national level. This is because such 
complementarities can take numerous forms and depend crucially on the type of action taken 
by Member States. Nevertheless, the discussion of complementarities and the simulation 
results on the effects of complementarities presented above can provide a basic idea about the 
mechanisms which are at work in this respect. To provide a further example, the Community 
efforts to complete the Internal Market have strong synergies with measures by Member 
States to improve the functioning of labour markets through making the latter more effective 
in delivering the desired benefits (e.g. by means of better regulation or increasing 
competition). Moreover, such measures can generate positive knowledge spillovers through 
increased trade in high-tech products and technologies. Evidence suggests that 60% of 
innovative companies in the EU tend to launch their new products on national markets while 
only 25% do it in other Member States too.
6
 Also, the "blue card" initiative to attract highly-
skilled professionals from outside the EU can positively interact with measures to raise skills 
of labour in general or the measures aimed at supporting R&D and innovation as well. 
The main results of the simulations with the WorldScan and QUEST models are the 
following: 
• Financial and venture capital markets: despite considerable achievements in integrating 
financial markets there is still significant scope for further progress. Efforts to complete the 
internal market for financial services would improve possibilities for risk sharing and 
would likely reduce the costs of lending. On the basis of the empirical evidence, it is 
reasonable to expect that this could lead to a reduction of capital costs by about 50 basis 
points.
7
 The effects, explored with the QUEST model, would be substantial: GDP would 
be up by about 0.1% in the first year, and would increase by around 0.75% in 2020 to 1% 
in the long-run (after 20 years). In a policy simulation using WorldScan effects of financial 
market integration are translated by a decrease in the cost of capital implemented through a 
decrease in the tax on investment, and the estimated impact is 0.5% of GDP by 2020 for 
                                                 
6
 Dierx et al. (2007). 
7
 See London Economics (2002), Hardouvelis et al. (2004), and Baele et al. (2004). 
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the EU25. Moreover, additional gains could stem from initiatives to develop EU-wide 
venture capital market. Economic studies suggest that increasing the availability and usage 
of venture capital by reducing the existing regulatory obstacles to venture capital 
investments could have a significant effect on the EU innovation rates and R&D intensity.
8
 
Naturally, the quantity and quality of venture capital is also determined by other factors 
such as the supply of high quality projects, venture competences and the existence of a 
'venture culture'. According to the recent Commission proposal
9
, additional €20 billion a 
year would be made available for venture capital investments. This would be the result if 
the removal of existing regulatory and tax obstacles to cross-border investments by venture 
capital funds were to lead to an average use of venture capital comparable to that of the 
current best performers The positive effect of reducing regulatory obstacles to venture 
capital investments is demonstrated in the QUEST model via a permanent 10 basis point 
reduction in EU equity risk premia and a 10% reduction in the cost of entry barriers. The 
combined shocks increase GDP by 0.75% in 2020 raising to 1% in the long-run, generated 
by an increase in physical investment and R&D. In the policy simulation with WorldScan 
it is assumed that the impulse in venture capital translates into an increase in total factor 
productivity for high-tech manufacturing and (business) services, yielding a GDP effect of 
0.6% by 2020 for the EU25. 
• Reducing the administrative burden of EU legislation: the Commission proceeds on its 
part with efforts to cut red tape and remove the unnecessary administrative burdens on 
European companies linked to complying with administrative requirements laid out in 
European legislation. These efforts complement those of Member States to cut red tape 
stemming from national regulations. EU legislation-related burdens are estimated to 
constitute 35% of the overall administrative burden. The Commission is committed in line 
with the general Lisbon target to reduce these compliance costs by 25%. Such a reduction 
releases human resources for more productive activities and is simulated in QUEST to lead 
to an increase in GDP of around 0.3% in 2020. This effect can grow to 0.7% if goods 
markets are sufficiently flexible and due to higher competition the reduction of costs for 
firms is passed on to consumers via a reduction in mark-ups. In WorldScan, the simulated 
overall economic effect of achieving the 25% administrative burden reduction targets 
related to Community legislation is 0.6% of GDP by 2020 for the EU25. 
• Electronic communication: analysis undertaken by the Commission shows that there are a 
number of key network industries and services that require particular attention, including 
electronic communications. Consequently, the Community should enhance single market 
policy and the enforcement of competition policy with the aim of increasing productivity 
and reducing prices for consumers, whilst ensuring the provision of services of general 
interest. For that purpose, the Community needs to enhance its market monitoring of key 
sectors including effects on consumers and use all available tools where necessary. 
Overall, improving competition and efficiency in services would improve competitiveness 
throughout the whole economy. A policy simulation using the WorldScan model assumes 
an increase of the capital efficiency in the electronic communication sector for those 
Member States that are below the EU average of the respective sectoral capital intensity. 
The relative increase in capital efficiency is equivalent to reaching the Community average 
                                                 
8
 See Kortum and Lerner (2000), Hellmann and Puri (2000) and Romain and van Pottelsbergh (2004).  
9
 See the Community Lisbon Programme 2008 – 2010. 
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in capital intensity of the electronic communication sector and causes a potential impact on 
the level of GDP for the EU25 at 0.2%. 
• Managed migration from outside the EU: the "blue-card" scheme, one of the elements of 
key area 8 in the CLP, has been introduced at the EU level to counter the skill shortages 
through attracting highly-skilled workers from outside the EU. The Community proposal 
accounts for an annual inflow of 74300 professionals between 2012 and 2020.
10
 A policy 
simulation with WorldScan on the impacts of this blue-card scheme and the associated 
increase in the supply of high-skilled workers yields a GDP impact of 0.2% by 2020 for 
the EU25. This is very similar to the simulated impact using QUEST, in which a positive 
impact on output of 0.2% in 2020is found, rising to 0.25% in the long-run. 
• Liberalising the electricity sector: efforts to progress with the energy sector liberalisation 
can deliver important benefits. Model simulations with QUEST explored the potential 
impact of further liberalisation of the electricity sector. According to a recent empirical 
study, greater competition could lead to reductions in electricity prices of about 10%, with 
decreases ranging from 2% for large households to 17% for small industrial firms.
11
 Price 
declines would materialise through efficiency improvements or reductions in mark-ups and 
they could result in long-run increases in GDP of approximately 0.3-0.4%, depending on 
the main transmission channel (with efficiency improvements generating higher effects). 
Simulation results with WorldScan suggest that unbundling of electricity markets would 
lead to a GDP increase of 0.3% by 2020 for the EU25. 
• Achieving the Greenhouse Gas Goals for 2020: The economic impact of achieving the 
2020 independent greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for 2020 of 20% was assessed 
with the GEM-E3 model in the Impact Assessment of the Communication on "Limiting 
Global Climate Change to 2 degrees". This work has been updated more recently to 
address the implementation of the energy and climate change package. The cost impact on 
EU GDP is projected to be limited at around 0.5% of GDP by 2020.
12
 This impact on EU 
GDP of independent EU action will decrease with access to the project-based Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). But unlimited access to CDM would see a large share of 
the emission reductions realised abroad because of the low marginal abatement costs in 
some countries abroad. However, none of these figures takes into account the co-benefits 
of internal emission reductions which would mitigate the negative impact on GDP: energy 
security will increase through for instance increased use of renewable energy; health costs 
decrease through lower levels of air pollution; innovation is spurred in new efficient 
energy technologies.
13
 By comparison, the longer-term impacts of climate change on the 
world economy could be as much as a decrease of 5-20% of GDP
14
. 
• Environmental technologies: the European Council’s ambitious climate change targets for 
2020 will require unprecedented investment in new low-carbon technologies and result in 
fundamental changes in the EU economy. A Community action is needed to ensure the 
                                                 
10
 See the Communication from the Commission "Policy plan on legal migration" COM(2005) 669 final. 
11
 Martin et al. (2005). 
12
 Impact Assessment for the Implementation of the Energy and Climate Change Package, 2008 
(forthcoming). 
13
 Full access to CDM by leading to lower levels of internal EU GHG reductions will lead to lower levels 
of co-benefits. 
14
 Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, H.M. Treasury October 2006. 
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development of a dynamic internal market for low carbon and energy/resource efficient 
technologies. Member State efforts to promote these industries inevitably lack the scope of 
market opportunities and economies of scale that could be realised through the 
development of a truly EU-wide market for environmental products, services, and 
technologies. Success therefore requires a new Community-wide sustainable industrial 
strategy in order to lead the transition towards a low carbon and resource efficient 
economy
15
 A particular aspect of this concerns the development and more energy-efficient 
production of end of the pipe technologies that in turn are facilitating the energy-efficient 
production of other manufacturing sectors. The respective policy simulation using the 
WorldScan model puts the magnitude of the potential effects on the level of the EU25 
GDP by 2020 at 0.4% applying conservative assumptions with respect to energy efficiency 
gains, the economic share of relevant technologies, and the annual penetration rate of these 
technologies over time. 
• Free Trade Agreements with South Korea, ASEAN, and India: the Community needs to 
open up new opportunities for trade and investment to EU businesses and to develop a 
common space of compatible regulatory provisions and standards with key trading 
partners, including the emerging economies. Opening up international markets provides 
greater market opportunities for EU companies abroad and increased competition and 
lower prices for consumers at home. Recent studies carried out for the Commission on the 
Free Trade Agreements with South Korea, ASEAN, and India suggest a combined impact 
of 0.1% of EU GDP.
16
 
The economic impacts suggested by the simulations reported in this document indicate the 
potential of a number of measures to contribute substantially to the standards of living of the 
EU citizens. While it is difficult to assess the magnitude of the interdependencies across all 
the policy measures covered here, it is likely that some synergies may magnify the effect of 
separate implementation, making the full impact of joint implementation stronger than the 
sum of these individual effects. Concerning the Community Lisbon Programme measures 
covered in table 2, the aggregation of individual effect pointing on average to a 2¾% increase 
of GDP relative to the situation without implementation of the measures seems a reasonable 
approximation of the joint effect of the measures. 
                                                 
15
 Commission Communication "Mid-term review of industrial policy: a contribution to the EU's Growth 
and Jobs Strategy" COM(2007) 374 of 4.7.2007 
16
 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/april/tradoc_134543.pdf 
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